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Paths to Central EuropeA Central European who lived in Budapest or Krakow fifteen years ago could probably say today that life is treating him amazingly well. The Communist regime is a thing of the past. No Iron Curtain separates the East from the West. Market economy and democracy are undisputed principles of political life, and since 1 May 2004, moreover, this Central European has also been a citizen of the European Union. At the same time, the term «Central Europe» no longer has the function of serving as an effective metaphor of protest against the division of Europe into East and West or black and white. Yet, as far as the convictions of Central Europeans and their need to define their own position in Europe are concerned, very little has changed. Claudio Magris begins his book Microcosms with a story by Gabriel Garcia Marquez about a cartographer who surveys the ventire world and then discovers to his surprise that the contours of this surveyed world resemble the contours of his face. Nonetheless, since 1989 not much has been said regarding the term «Central Europe», which up to then had been a means of giving expression to intellectual protest against the division of Europe into a seemingly clearly defined East and West. Who remembers today that in the mid-eighties, Milan Kundera wrote of The Tragedy of Central Europe as of the kidnapping of part of the West by the Soviets, Vaclav Havel demanded «Living in Truth» and György Konrad proposed the «antipolitics» of private citizens – today we would call it an active civil society – as a remedy for Real Socialism? It seems that as a term of protest, «Central Europe» has fulfilled its purpose and we can leave its analysis to contemporary historians and feuilletonists. Since 1 May 2004, the core regions of Central Europe have been part of the European Union. So do we still need initiatives for Central European cooperation projects or even for shared perspectives? Yes, we do, because the chances of the individual states as far as economic, social and cultural life are concerned depend on the ability to work together in the region. The clearest answer arises from the way others perceive this region and from the bizarre continuities of its classification. At least since the Middle Ages, there has been a tradition that Central Europe is a «periphery of the West». From 1945 to 1989, Central Europe was considered part of the «East». Are we now entering on a long phase in which Central Europeans will become the fringe of Western Europe and – as Peter Esterházy has written – be assigned, at best, the role of «trouble-makers» who want to participate in its prosperity? The cities and states of this region traditionally feel themselves to be both centre and periphery. After all, Central Europe consists mainly of peripheries, and the repeatedly shifted borders have given each location a remembrance of being the periphery. Is Vienna, for example, the German periphery, the border to the Balkans, or an extension of what used to be the West? Perhaps we should listen to the advice of the geopoliticians: The identity and position of the Central European states is and has always been a result of their relationship to their neighbours, because these constitute important parts of their «own» history or – as in the case of the large neighbours Germany and Russia – because they are unequal partners in dialogue. After the experiences of division and separation in the 20th century, there is still a lot of work left to do on neighbourly relations. Emotionally and intellectually, the rupture of nearly 50 years of Communism is still very much in evidence. Approaching one another requires political reinforcement. For this reason, the Slovenian author Drago Jancar opposes exclusively pragmatic politics intended merely as «service for organising mutual affairs». For Jancar, only creativity – which includes artistic creativity – offers a refuge from the «absurd ideas of the numskulls» and their «analytic and pragmatic world». Creativity, he says, safeguards us against the temptation to forget, for art preserves «all of human experience». Central Europe lives from its traditions of having experienced a variety of cultural patterns as being creative (border crossings and border shifts, multilingualism, ethnic nationalism). Out of the experience of constant changes has grown a form of Central European scepticism. From this perspective, eternal optimism somehow appears to be ridiculous and comical (György Konrad). Here lies the point of departure for new Central European goals and responsibilities, which can aim at a reasonable differentiation from the West. But it is not enough to make Central Europe into a ritually conjured up clan of Kananian origin. It is a nice thing if a Viennese rediscovers his own past in Czernowitz or someone from Budapest can somehow feel at home in Krakow. But the common cultural region can only have a future if there are real common interests. Central European traditions and perspectives can be a strength for our countries in the EU if we have awareness for questions relating to the history of this region, such as: What were the preconditions for the creative milieu of Central Europe at the beginning of the 20th century? Then it would quickly become clear that it is a real problem that travelling from Krakow to Vienna by train took 5 hours and 43 minutes in the 19th century and today it takes 8 hours. It would become clear that today people in neighbouring countries are less versed in each other’s languages than they were around 1900. It would also become clear that in these countries, the same universities that exist today – including universities in the territory that is now Austria – had many more students from other linguistic groups around 1900 than they have now. These examples have little to do with nostalgia, and much more to do with possible Central European perspectives. On the map, it seems that with the expansion of the EU, the longing for a cultural Central Europe is shifting to the east and southeast. Today intellectuals in Croatia, Serbia, Romania and Ukraine are speaking of their fantasy of a Central European world in which they could belong. Several years ago, the Western Ukrainian author Juri Andruchowytsch made a list of reasons for the positive attitude of Western Ukrainians towards the terms «Galicia» and Central Europe, a list that is very much oriented to the postmodern qualities of the late Habsburg monarchy («Grandmother Austria»)1. He begins by stating that «especially thanks to the infinite diversity of languages and ethnic groups in that world, the Ukrainian element was able to survive ... without the old Austrian Empire we would not be here today». His ironic declaration of love is the statement: «I think that for this reason alone, the 'old Prohazka', the Emperor Franz Joseph I, would have deserved the Nobel Prize for cultural preservation of a species, if such a prize were awarded posthumously and existed at all.» He refers to the dialect of the Western Ukrainians, with its Germanisms such as «szlak by joho trafyw». He refers to the amazing liberality of this empire, which had to offer refuge to practically everyone «from the Hassidim ... to the quite ordinary Gypsies from the Marmaros». He mentions the architecture it bequeathed to the cities, which «despite all adverse circumstances resisted decay». And he refers to the perspective of «looking to the West». Galicia was part of a common political organism, together with cities like Venice and Vienna: «At the beginning of our century I would not have needed a visa in order to meet with Rilke or maybe with Gustav Klimt.» With the rediscovery of the history of Central Europe, subjects and myths appear which contradict modern thinking in terms of national states. Nevertheless, examining them can often tell us more about the current situation of a region and its inhabitants than political commentaries about the future architecture of Europe. In Central Europe, identity is conveyed primarily through history. But history’s message is highly ambiguous. Those who can call themselves victors are more dependent on time than on location. This explains an anonymous classified advertisement that appeared in a Warsaw newspaper prior to 1989: «Rich history, to trade for better geography». In Czernowitz recently, during restoration work, a statue of the «Austria» was rediscovered which had been missing from its pedestal since 1918. Apparently it had been buried at the time in hopes that it would be found again in better times. Only the head of the statue is lacking. About 50 years ago, in his practical instructions for demolishing monuments, the Polish aphorist Stanislaw Jerzy Lec had recommended to the Central Europeans: «Leave the pedestal where it is. You’ll need it later.» The irony of Central Europe’s history lies in the fact that although the great radical European projects of the previous century, nationalism and communism, lastingly destroyed real connections in this region, the feeling of «parallel life» in Central Europe was still not completely lost. Historical myths and stories form the basis of the cultural identities of communities. In the Central European region, the many changes of borders, regimes and ideologies, as well as shifts in population and assimilation processes in the 20th century, have created a particular sensitivity for history and its role in the constitution and alteration of collective identities. Especially ethnic and ideological impressions of history grew into rival political arguments for forming communities, which were intended to erase or repress parts of cultural traditions. The present-day European situation since the fall of the Iron Curtain is therefore interpreted as a «return of history», particularly in the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe. The ideological division of Europe between 1945 and 1989 had not provided historically legitimated identities with any substantial scope for development, either in the West or in the East. The postwar settlement in Yalta was supposed to establish new traditions in East and West. A boundary was set up between past and present which 50 years later was finally recognised as having been untenable. In the West, conflict-laden ethnic identity politics were to be replaced by an enlightened and democratic European integration process. In the Communist eastern part of Europe a «bourgeois» conception of the world was to be eradicated. With the fall of the totalitarian regimes in Central and Eastern Europe, history once again became evidence for both the continuity of societies and their capacity to learn. Since 1989, concepts of history as an instrument of enlightenment and as a means of building a sense of community (ethnically and politically) have been vying for recognition2. An indication of this is that historical topics which were previously taboo are now being publicly discussed and that enlightenment and collective identity-building are considered to go hand-in-hand with this type of discussion. In the course of such processes, history can also become fuel for political conflicts (e.g. the role of ethnic and national communities in National Socialism, the ethnically-motivated mass expulsions after the end of World War II, individual responsibility in Communism). This is a signal that the enlightening function of history is also gaining importance in questions of community-building. Austria experienced this in the «Waldheim discussion» and in the so-called «Bedenkjahr» («year of reflection») in 1988. In the Central European neighbour states, there will be increasing discussion about «correct history» and about the stereotypes of the region. This is part of the learning process of society in a democracy. Historians and social scientists in Central Europe are trying to discuss these things in cooperation as much as possible, and in this, too, it makes sense for Austria to take the initiative in various ways, for example in compiling joint historical documentation. It is not a simple task. The permanent search for identity and the great frequency of conflicts have made manipulating traditions at will the rule rather than the exception. In literature, Robert Musil and also Thomas Bernhard have described this as the «unreality» of reality. In this regard I should like to refer to the late Habsburg monarchy’s attempts to create popularity for an Austrian Reichsidee («idea of the Reich»), as well as to the propounding of national traditions in the states of the interwar period. The most obvious example of this appeared after 1918 in the official «anti-Austria» campaign of the newly created Czechoslovakia. The Communist regimes after 1945 were able to follow up on this in their decades of efforts to deform the collective historical consciousness and block out parts of the collective memory. But which history has returned to Central Europe since 1989? Primarily, the history of the nations of this region. At the same time, however, there is an interest in coming to terms with subjects that have been repressed and which underline the European context of the history of the new democracies. The hope is that the common cultural elements of Central Europe will immunise the region against nationalism and support its return to Europe. The search for common interests was already a determining factor of the intellectual discussion of the 1980s. Public discourse about Central Europe and about the deception of the Real Socialist systems created a moral impetus that became embodied in Vaclav Havel’s demand that people «live in truth» (an update of Thomas Masaryk’s motto «Truth will prevail»). The demand for the right to «truth and remembrance» is related to the goal of the development of a critical consciousness and an «identity» that not only tolerates contradictions, but recognises them as being characteristic of a collective self-understanding3 It is worthwhile to remember the historical accounts of this region and the experiences of the brief 20th century. Border shifts resulting from World War II, expulsions and the resettlement of ethnic minorities contradict every theory of continuity. The return of history to these countries is not only a liberation from Communism, but also the return of the history of national groups, in a form which allows nations to find points of connection4. Usually this means the interwar period. The history of the interwar era, however, is not a history of new departures in democracy. Authoritarian power structures, political illusions and national falsifications of history were among the characteristics of the states which arose after 1918. Communism after 1945 was able to build on this, too. The states of Central Europe after 1918 were characterised by their inheritance of the nationality struggles of old Austria. The national myths of the ethnic groups in the Central European region – and these are always historical myths – grew out of the spirit of Romanticism, not out of the Enlightenment, und they always contain two principle elements of «nationalism»: the first has to do with the conviction that one’s own nation should be defined by dissociating it from its neighbours (exclusion theory) and the second has to do with a striving for political and cultural superiority (superiority theory). This region is not marked by traditions of equal rights, but rather by the conviction that only «supremacy», in the sense of dissociation and the communication of cultural superiority, ensures national survival5. The ideological division of Europe up to 1989 preserved long-term traditions of cultural inhomogeneity, which Manes Sperber called the «bizarre presence of history», in the central part of Europe. For this reason historical research, the communication of a sense of community (identity) through historical images, and the struggle for remembrance are of great importance to the political and social transformation of Central, Eastern and Southeastern Europe. Historical discourses have accompanied the political transformation and have influenced it with arguments of translocal cultural connections between traditions (Central Europe debate). Such discourses fulfil legitimating functions (national historical myths) and have a determining influence on public discussions in and about the new democracies (e.g. coming to terms with the history of World War II and Communism). Since 1989, history has been far more than a subject of dispute between historians; it has become a medium of and a means for the construction of political and national identities. The interpretations of the situation after 1989 range from the «return of history»6to the «end of history»7. During the transformation, the representation of history has become an instrument of self-reassurance (history as part of the political culture), which has recourse to the terms «truth» and «remembrance». At the same time, clear contradictions are becoming evident between today’s common historical theories of deconstruction (cultural studies), which examine the representational character of history (language and symbols), and ideas of historical truth, which in a political transformation are committed to the traditions of enlightenment8. Historical pictures are being updated as specific patterns of tradition that can take the place of the East-West controversy, which had repressed and yet preserved traditional conflicts, prejudices and common interests. Central Europe’s specific contribution to Europe lies primarily in the fact that critical ideas about the concept of progress in modern civilization exist and are being placed alongside the concept of cultural plurality. In the progress-oriented way of thinking, there is only one direction and one ideal for the development of society. Face to face with this ideal of Western, enlightened liberalness are antiquated and belated societies that are being evaluated according to how quickly they can catch up with the achievements of civilisation in progressive states. From this point of view, the important question today is how fast the transformation countries of the East can adapt. The motto for this is «return to Europe». The economic success of the principles of market economy is seen as the confirmation of the success of this progress-oriented optimism. But now the experiences of the «other» Europe are reviving certain critical reflections on the role of progress ideologies that were being made at the beginning of the 20th century in the Viennese fin-de-siècle. Praise of the virtues of slowness, and criticism of the reduction of the value of human beings to their rationality are approaches that are becoming topical as a result of the experiences of the «other» Europe. The geography of Europe is again becoming a political category, and the inner and outer borders of Europe are being discussed according to its principles. In the former «East», reflections about «regions» and «places» and their cultural differentiations and connections had the function of counteracting ideologically-based tendencies towards standardisation. In the new Europe, the geographic situation has become a «geopolitical» factor of how people and nations see themselves culturally and politically. The political transformation of Central Europe not only makes Europe geographically larger; it also reintroduces the subject of cultural diversity, with its conflicts and its incentives, into the European debate. Central Europe, with its cultural multi-coding, plays a central role in this9. Europe is becoming linguistically, religiously and ethnically more diverse. At the same time, languages, traditions and cultural regions are becoming components of a democratic political dialogue in which representatives of various cultural and ethnic identities can demand historical reappraisal, restitution and «justice» (e.g. Sudeten Germans and Roma). When in Europe today, people talk about the principles and the practical processes of democracy, this is, to a great extent, the result of the opposition of private citizens in civil society who fought for and won freedom in Central and Eastern Europe and who today are working on building up civil society structures in their states. The striking thing about this is that traditional ties, such as the churches, are also seen as opportunities for building a sense of community and instituting reforms in civil society. Within the EU states, as well, there is a demand for more civil society and public participation. It is part of the cultural traditions of Central Europe to live in a region where boundaries are constantly being overstepped – where, in fact, boundaries are considered something relative, which can be changed. In Central and Eastern Europe it is not only a literary tradition to see boundaries and peripheral regions as creative places, which inherently are culturally challenging due to the fact that they are not seen exclusively as areas that require civilising. In the cultural memories of the new democracies of Eastern Central Europe there seems to be, at the same time, more room for contradictory traditions (e.g. should Slovenia think of itself as Mediterranean, Southeastern European or Central European?) and for forms of remembrance that can convey a sense of community (e.g. how important is the Catholic Church for the identity of Poland?) than in the Western European democracies. The East has given Europe a number of very different realities. Mythical regions (Galicia, Transylvania) and cities that have been all but forgotten (Krakow, Czernowitz, Vilnius, Odessa) are becoming attractive tourist destinations. However, the memories also include ethnic irreconcilabilities that were negated by Communism or exploited by it for its own purposes10. The central and eastern parts of Europe have traditions of living with ethnic, linguistic and religious minorities, which the 19th century as the «century of assimilation» and the 20th century as the «century of extremes» have not completely destroyed. Minority questions are again becoming the test of the quality of political order, and a point of departure for Central European cooperation. All this makes it clear that for the future of Central Europe, not only its preponderance of history is important, but also the question of whether we, as Europeans, can find enough interest in one another to create, out of our densely woven histories, a common context, shared ideas for dealing with a diversity of languages and cultures. In fact, a comprehensive «recontextualisation» of political theory and practice seems to be taking place. In his study Kosmopolis, Stephen Toulmin pointed out the connection between decontextualisation and political rationality11. Just as, in the sciences, Descartes and Newton developed processes that made it possible to answer questions independently of context, this idea also became accepted in politics (Thomas Hobbes), because it could be brought into relation with the requirements of society in the centralised national states of the 18th and 19th centuries as well as with the political utopias and economic ideas of globalisation of the 20th century. The recontextualisation (return of history and geography) which has been clearly recognisable since 1989 can have long-term political effects on Europe, because it supports a pluralisation of discourse and thus the forms and the quality of communication between regions, and because it is once more making the memories and identities of these regions an important socio-political issue. Central Europe is again becoming a place of «parallel life». For some, the expansion of the EU may seem like a project for incorporating Central Europe into the West as an investment in an economic competition meant to make Europe a «global player». In fact, the European Union is becoming more Central European, and it is taking on all the opportunities and experiences that characterise this cultural region, a region in which Austria can no longer merely act like an interested, observing neighbour. To recapitulate the challenges of the Central European location – challenges which, for a Western European, may possibly seem not only paradox but also provoking: this region has traditionally oriented itself on its boundaries and found self-definition with the help of these boundaries. It is a region so laden with history that forging a common future can only succeed if the past is fully discussed. It seems to be a Central European principle that one never believes that progress is really as great as it appears to be. Neither has it been customary to treat others with equality. For these reasons, Austria and its Central European neighbours need not only better road and railway connections and more border crossings to each other, but an actual, existing «regional partnership». But this is not easy to achieve. We need to learn our neighbours’ languages. We must not call out for protection mechanisms or sovereignty every time a problem arises. We have to create and maintain networks in which people can get involved in neighbouring relations. This is why I sincerely hope not only that the ABC Network has been a success, but also that it will be continued in the future. Translator’s Note: All footnotes in this text refer to the sources used by the author. German-language quotations were re-translated into English. English editions of the German works cited, if available, are indicated in parentheses.
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